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Chapter 7 
Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception 
Peggy DesAutels 
Moral philosophers often assume that there are clear and unambiguous 
single descriptions of particular moral situations, and thus they view their 
primary task as that of determining the most moral action to take when in 
these situations~ But surely there is less chance of there being a single and 
final way to describe a given moral situation than there is of there being a 
single and final way to organize and describe a visual display.'Although 
we perceive many of our day-to-day moral experiences in an unreflective 
and even reflexive manner, it is also possible for us to (and we often do) 
"reperceive" moral situations. On one end of the spectrum, we can slightly 
adjust our original perceptions by attending to details of moral significance 
that were at first unnoticed. Or on the other end of the spectrum, we can 
dramatically shift from our original perceptions to very different moral 
perspectives or frameworks. 
I argue in this chapter that gestalt shifts play a significant role in the 
mental processes used to determine the moral saliencies of particular situa-
tions. I build on the recent debate between Carol Gilligan and Owen 
Flanagan over the relevance of the gestalt-shift metaphor to the organiza-
tion and reorganization of our moral perceptions (Gilligan 1987; Flanagan 
and Jackson 1990; Gilligan and Attanucci 1988; and Flanagan 1991). 
Throughout the course of this debate, neither of them directly referred to 
important related issues found in philosophical and psychological discus-
sions of perception.' I propose to place this debate within that broader 
context and argue that a discussion of gestalt shifts in moral perception is 
directly linked to the more general consideration of how it is that we 
abstract from and draw meaning out of situations.' Connectionist models of 
cognition, along with research on the role of tasks, metaphors, and ana-
logies in perceptual mental processes, help answer the question, To what 
degree and under what conditions do we experience gestalt shifts in the 
organization of our moral perceptions? 
Before continuing, it may be helpful to consider a specific example of a 
gestalt shift in moral perception. Stephen R. Covey provides a dramatic 
account of "re-seeing" moral saliencies in his best-seller, The Seven Habits of 
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Highly Effective People. Although the description is rather extended, I in-
clude most of it. His setting of the scene and his description of how he 
reframed the situation will be useful for further discussion and analysis: 
I (Covey] remember a mini-paradigm shift I experienced one Sunday 
morning on a subway in New York. People were sitting quietly-
some reading newspapers, some lost in thought, some resting with 
their eyes closed. It was a calm, peaceful scene. 
Then suddenly, a man and his children entered the subway car. 
The children were so loud and rambunctious that instantly the whole 
climate changed. 
The man sat down next to me and closed his eyes, apparently 
oblivious to the situation. The children were yelling back and forth, 
throwing things, even grabbing people's papers. It was very dis-
turbing. And yet, the man sitting next to me did nothing. 
It was difficult not to feel irritated. I could not believe that he 
could be so insensitive as to let his children run wild like that and do 
nothing about it, taking no responsibility at all. It was easy to see 
that everyone else on the subway felt irritated, too. So finally, with 
what I felt was unusual patience and restraint, I turned to him and 
said, "Sir, your children are really disturbing a lot of people. I wonder 
if you couldn't control them a little more?" 
The man lifted his gaze as if to come to a consciousness of the 
situation for the first time and said softly, uOh, you're right. I guess I 
should do something about it. We just came from the hospital where 
their mother died about an hour ago. I don't know what to think. and 
I guess they don't know how to handle it either." 
... Suddenly I saw things differently, and because I saw differently, 
I thought differently, I felt differently, I behaved differently (Covey's 
emphasis]. My irritation vanished. I didn't have to worry about con-
trolling my attitude or my behavior; my heart was filled with the 
man's pain. Feelings of sympathy and compas~ion flowed freely .... 
Everything changed in an instant. (Covey 1989, 30-31) 
Not~ tha~ Covey refers to this experience as a "mini-paradigm shift." 
~y dISCUSSIOn of gestalt shifts in moral perception will certainly overlap 
wIth recent discussions of "paradigm shifts" in scientific theories.! How-
ever, I refer to a shift in the organizing of a particular moral situation as a 
gestalt shift to emphasize that not all shifts are as incommensurable as 
Kuhn's paradigm shifts. 
Some might argue that shifts in moral perception are few and far be-
tween, but I argue that gestalt shifts, are common and unavoidable, and 
they playa significant role in the mental processes used to perceive partic-
ular moral situations. More specifically, I argue that gestalt shifts range 
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from shifts between "unmergeable" or "rival" details of a perceived situa-
tion to shifts between entire organizing perspectives of a situation; and 
these shifts play a significant role in the mental processes used to deter-
mine the moral saliencies of particular situations. I differentiate between 
our more unreflective day-to-day moral perceptions (which incorporate 
what I term framework shifts as a result of switching tasks) and our more 
deliberative moral "perceptions" (which include both framework shifts and 
what I term component shifts). 
Gilligan: Shifts between Care and Justice Perspectives 
Carol Gilligan, a moral psychologist, has focused much of her work on 
differences in moral reasoning between male and female research partici-
pants. In her early studies, subjects were presented with short descriptions 
of hypothetical dilemmas and then asked to reason morally about these 
dilemmas. More recently, Gilligan has asked her subjects (both male and 
female) to supply and describe their own examples of moral dilemmas. She 
switched to soliciting real-life moral dilemmas in order to discover which 
experiences the subjects themselves most viewed as moral dilemmas. As 
a result of this work, Gilligan offers the following psychological moral 
theory: 
1) Concerns about justice and care are both represented in people's 
thinking about real-life moral dilemmas, but people tend to focus on 
one set of concerns and minimally represent the other; and 2) there is 
an association between moral orientation and gender such that both 
men and women use both orientations, but Care Focus dilemmas are 
more likely to be presented by women and Justice Focus dilemmas 
by men. (Gilligan and Attanucci 1988, 88) 
Gilligan views unfairness-fairness and inequality-equality as those saliencies 
most associated with the justice perspective, and attachment-detachment 
and responsibility-irresponsibility as those saliencies most associated with 
the care perspective (Gilligan 1987, 20). In the passage above, Gilligan 
acknowledges that the same person may be able to organize moral experi-
ences from either the justice or the care perspective, but she argues that 
one perspective predominates. When we do view a particular situation 
using both perspectives, Gilligan maintains that we shift between perspec-
tives rather than organize that particular experience by at once combining 
justice and care concerns. 
I will not discuss the degree to which justice, or care, or both predomi-
nates in men's and women's overall moral orientations. Rather, I will 
describe Gilligan's views on shifts. Gilligan compares the shift between 
justice and care perspectives to visual gestalt shifts that take place when 
viewing ambiguous figures. She writes: 
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Like the figure-ground shift in ambiguous figure perception, justice 
and care as moral perspectives are not opposites or mirror-images of 
one another, with justice uncaring and care unjust.' Instead; these 
perspectives denote different ways of organizing the basic elements 
of moral judgment: self, others, and the relationship between them.\ 
(Gilligan 1987, 22) 
Although admitting that more research needs to be done on "whether, for 
example, people alternate perspectives, like seeing the rabbit and the duck 
in the rabbit-duck figure, or integrate the two perspectives in a way that 
resolves or sustains ambiguity" (Gilligan 1987, 26), she does argue that we 
, vacillate between rather than integrate the justice and care perspectives. 
She refers to the "focus phenomenon," whereby subjects lose sight of one 
group of potential saliencies (justice saliencies) and focus instead on an-
other group (care saliencies) in moral perception. \,. 
Gilligan's evidence for the contention that we shift between perspec-
tives that are "not readily integratable" is garnered from research subjects' 
verbal descriptions of moral situations. Subjects were deemed to have 
switched perspectives when the terms they used in one analysis of the 
moral dilemma did not contain the terms of another analysis of the same 
dilemma. She refers to the doctoral research of Kay Johnston in which 
children and teenagers were presented with a moral dilemma in fable form. 
According to Johnston, about half the children "spontaneously switched 
moral orientations" (they switched terminology) when asked if there was 
another way to "solve the problem" (Gilligan 1987, 26-27). 
It is worth noting that Gilligan leaves room for the possibility that there 
are more than two moral orientations when she refers to "at least two 
moral orientations" (Gilligan 1987, 26, my emphasis). She does not, how-
ever, conjecture on the nature or composition of any additional moral 
perspectives beyond care and justice. 
Flanagan: Integrated Moral Perceptions 
Owen Flanagan takes a more interdisciplinary approach to moral cognition 
and brings recent advances in cognitive science, moral theory, and psy-
chology to bear on the issues surrounding moral perception. In his discus-
sion of Gilligan's two perspectives, Flanagan primarily wishes to take issue 
with the degree to which persons have a dominant orientation, but he also 
objects to certain aspects of Gilligan's use of the gestalt-shift metaphor. He 
describes three ways in which the metaphor is helpful and even illumi-
nating but follows this discussion with three ways in which it is "unhelpful 
and misleading" (Flanagan 1991, 214). His primary objections to the meta-
phor are: (1) "Not all moral issues are so open to alternative construals"; 
Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception 133 
(2) "Moral consideration, unlike visual perception, takes place over time 
and can involve weighing as much, and as messy, information as we like"; 
and (3)'''The metaphor calls attention to the gross features of moral per-
ception [but] much of what is most interesting and individually distinctive 
about moral personality lies in the small details of what is noticed, deliber-
ated about, and acted on" (Flanagan 1991,214-217). , . 
In the following sections, I bring recent developments in cognitive 
science to this discussion of the role of gestalt shifts in organizing moral 
experience. 
Gestalt Shifts 
I do not limit the definition of a gestalt shift to examples of completely 
polar and/or incommensurable organizations. Rather I include any two 
mental organizations that cannot be merged into one (or are incompatible 
in some way), no matter how much these two organizations may have in 
common. Another way to put this is to use the visual focus metaphor. 
When one set of saliencies comes into focus, most members of that set (but 
not necessarily all) go out of focus when the competing set of saliencies 
comes into focus. The duck-rabbit image (figure 7.1) is a more extreme 
example of a visual image that can result in our experiencing two distinct 
and incompatible perceptions. When we see the duck. we do not see the 
rabbit; and after switching to seeing the rabbit, we do not see the duck. 
However, images with figure-ground ambiguities can also result in the 
experience of a gestalt shift (figure 7.2). In figure-ground shifts, there is 
Figure 7.1 
Duck-rabbit ambiguous figure. From Mind Sights by Roger N. Shepard. Copyright © 1990 
by Roger N . Shepard. Reprinted with permission of W. H. Freeman and Company. 
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Figure 7.2 
Figure-ground ambiguity. From Mind Sights by Roger N. Shepard. Copyright © 1990 by 
Roger N. Shepard. Reprinted with permission of W. H. Freeman and Company. 
more of an emphasis on refocusing, where background becomes fore-
ground and foreground becomes background, rather than an emphasis on 
incompatible and completely distinct figure interpretations. 2 Gilligan and I 
define gestalt shifts as incorporating both incompatible figures and figure-
ground ambiguities, whereas Flanagan emphasizes more the view that 
gestalt shifts (and thus gestalt shift metaphors) necessarily include a more 
radical figure incommensurability. 
The experience of a gestalt shift in moral perception mayor may not be 
provoked by an external stimulus. Just as it can be mentioned to someone 
"stuck" seeing only a rabbit that the image can also be seen as a duck (and 
the "bill" of the duck can even be directly pointed to), so can someone 
supply new information that encourages the reperceiving of a moral situa-
tion. Covey's shift, for example, was preceded by new information from 
the man in the subway. But one could also imagine Covey's reperceiving 
the situation with no external stimulus. For instance, he could have sud-
denly noticed that these children were behaving similarly to children he 
had observed previously at a parent's funeral service. 
When a shift in moral perception is preceded by an external stimulus, 
there is a sense in which the'situation itself has changed~I wish to empha-
size, however, that gestalt shifts can occur even when the "input" to a 
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perception changes to some degree.IGestalt shifts occur in such cases 
when the new piece of perceptual input is not simply added on or incorpo-
rated into the original perception; rather, at least some of the original 
perceptual input array is mentally reorganized.' 
It is also important to this discussion to distinguish between a frame-
work gestalt shift and a component gestalt shift (hereafter referred to as 
framework shift and component shift). What I term a framework shift 
involves (1) a mental switch from one way of organizing an entire experi-
ence to a different way of organizing that experience and (2) some sense in 
which the two ways of organizing the experience are incompatible-in 
other words, the two overall organizations cannot be merged into a single 
overall organization. The duck-rabbit switch would be a framework shift if 
the duck-rabbit image filled our entire viewing screen as it were-if the 
duck-rabbit image comprised our perceptual experience. 
On the other hand, what I term a component shift involves (1) a mental 
shift from one way of organizing a detail (component) of an experience to 
a different way of organizing that detail, and (2) some sense in which the 
two ways of organizing that detail of experience are incompatible. A 
visual example of a component shift is the shift that would occur when 
viewing the duck-rabbit image as part of a larger scene. For instance, we 
may see a person wearing a t-shirt with many patterns on it, one of which 
is the duck-rabbit pattern. The overall organization of the scene remains 
the same (a person wearing a t-shirt with patterns on it), but a detail in the 
scene shifts. For the purposes of this discussion, then, a gestalt shift occurs 
whenever the perceiver shifts between the deployment of one already-
existing organizing mental structure to the deployment of another 
already-existing organizing structure in the perceiving of at least some 
(if not all) of a particular situation or experience. 
Moral perceptions can involve either framework or component shifts. 
For example, we could continue to frame a particular woman's abortion 
dilemma around the status of the fetus (rather than reorganizing the frame 
around the relationship of that woman to the fetus) but shift between 
viewing the fetus first as an unborn child and then as a simple growth. 
Such a shift would be a component shift in moral perception. With these 
clarifications in mind, let us move on to consider when and under what 
conditions gestalt shifts in moral perception are most likely to take place. 
Tasks and Gestalt Shifts in Moral Perception 
As we go about our daily lives, it only makes sense that our current tasks 
would heavily influence which of all possible perceptual organizations 
(possible for us with the learning history that each of us has) is actually 
brought online. If there is something we are trying to accomplish, we will 
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notice and abstract out those aspects of our experience that most help us 
to achieve our objective. Our days are filled with such tasks as fulfilling 
job requirements, running errands, getting x done, solving problem y, and 
so on. 
Neither Gilligan nor Flanagan directly addresses the relationship be-
tween task switching and gestalt shifts in moral perception. In this section, 
I argue that in our more unreflective day-to-day moral perceptions, an 
important relationship exists between switching tasks and gestalt shifts in 
moral perception. The obvious result of acknowledging this relationship is 
the additional acknowledgment that there are many more gestalt shifts in 
our day-to-day moral perceptions than either Gilligan or Flanagan postu-
lates and many of these shifts are between perceptual organizations other 
than the justice-care organizations. 
An inherent difficulty in analyzing the relationship between perceptual 
organizations and tasks is that of determining the best level of description 
for particular tasks. A task can be described at any number of levels of 
generality or complexity. To keep this discussion of tasks simple, I de-
scribe someone as engaged in a particular task (mental or otherwise) if it 
makes sense that the person would describe herself as currently engaged in 
that task if asked (for example, "What are you doing right now?" ''I'm 
trying to figure out what's fair.") 
In Varieties of Moral Personality, Flanagan relates the perceptual process 
of abstracting out certain features of a situation to a person's current task. 
He specifies two main types of abstraction: feature detection (or classifica-
tory abstraction) and task-guided abstraction. These two main types of 
abstraction are not mutually exclusive mental processes but interact in 
complex ways. He defines feature detection as involving "the cognitive 
isolation or recognition of just those properties (sometimes called essential 
properties) which warrant classifying some token as a member of a type 
or kind" (83-84). He defines task-guided abstraction as the deployment 
of rationalized procedures that "warrant paying differential attention, and 
giving differential treatment, to various features of an object, event, or 
situation" in order to complete a given task successfully (85). All kinds of 
abstraction involve highlighting or separating out the features of some 
thing or event that bring it under the correct cognitive description relative 
to its actual nature and the aims of the person doing the abstracting. 
Task-guided abstraction goes further and involves deployment of rational-
ized procedures deemed appropriate to the successful completion of the 
task at hand. These procedures warrant paying differential attention, and 
giving differential treatment, to various features of an object, event, or 
situation.' My point is this: to the degree that our perceptions are task 
guided, we will shift our perceptions and the organized saliencies of our 
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perceptions when we shift tasks. Thus, switches to significantly diffe~nt 
tasks will often involve what I consider to be gestalt shifts in perception. 
Of course, not all task switches precipitate shifts in moral perception. 
Since neither mowing my lawn nor raking the cuttings is likely to include 
the perception of any moral saliencies, it is highly unlikely that switching 
from mowing to raking will result in a gestalt shift in moral perception. So 
it is important at this point to examine what kinds of day-to-day tasks and 
task switches most affect moral perceptions. Clearly, switching between 
ostensibly "moral" tasks will be most likely to affect moral perceptions. 
For example, switching from the task of determining what is most fair to 
that of determining what is most caring may well result in our reorganizing 
our experience.3 Most of us are not engaged in self-described moral 
tasks much of the time. We may live by such high-level moral goals as 
that of responding morally when it is called for, but the specific task of re-
sponding morally may be initiated only intermittently in our day-to-day 
experience. 
This is not to say that we do not make moral judgments and determine 
moral saliencies unless engaged in a self-described moral task. In fact, any 
task that includes interactions with others will often incorporate the mak-
ing of moral judgments, assessments, or both. The most obvious day-to-
day task likely to involve moral perceptions is our "job."4 For instance, 
the moral qualities of those who most determine our job success will often 
be the qualities of most salience to us throughout our workday. 
To illustrate, while engaged in solving a problem at work with a col-
league, I am most likely to organize my perceptual experience around the 
obstacles and means to solving this work-related problemhf my colleague 
is preventing the project from proceeding, I view this colleague as "difficult" 
(at best), and all of her personality faults become highly salient in my 
experience. However, I may also have a high-level goal of treating others 
with compassion when they are "in need." Even in the middle of an 
intense, work-related discussion, I may notice something out of sorts with 
my colleague, "interrupt" my foreground work-related task, and initiate 
my "treat others with compassion" moral task. 5 As a result, I switch to 
reperceiving the saliencies in my colleague's behavior most important to 
my responding with compassion. In this case, the shift in my moral percep-
tions is tied to my switching from an ostensibly "nonmoral" task (which 
nonetheless incorporates moral perceptions) to a "moral" task. t 
I can also switch, for example, from a more general moral task of 
attempting to determine the most fair thing to do in a situation to the 
more specific moral task of seeing things from another person's point of 
view. This switch from a general to a more specific moral task also results 
in reorganizing the moral saliencies of the situation at hand. 
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Even Gilligan's examples of shifting from the justice to the care perspec-
tive can be viewed as switching between the moral task of determining 
what is most fair and the moral task of determining what is most caring. 
Certainly some may not wish to describe this change in orientation as so 
closely intertwined with a task switch. There are surely other ways to 
describe the reorientation, but viewing the shift as tied to task switching 
accomplishes two objectives:'(l) I emphasize that the perceiver's goals and 
activities have much more relevance to the perceived moral saliencies of a 
situation than most others have presumed, and (2) I deemphasize the role 
of inherent aspects of a situation itself and emphasize instead how much of 
moral perception is directed by the perceiver. 6"~ In our day-to-day lives, 
different and competing saliencies occur primarily because we switch to 
different tasks with their accompanying different objectives. 
Covey's mini-paradigm shift described at the beginning of this chapter 
could also be viewed as tied to his switching from the moral task of 
determining what would bring most peace and harmony to the passengers 
on the subway to the moral task of determining what would bring most 
comfort and compassion to the family whose mother had just died. There 
may have been others on the subway car who were entirely focused on 
their own tasks of whatever sort and thus failed to notice anything other 
than the fact that there were some loud but ignorable children in the 
"background." Interestingly, it could even be argued that Covey experi-
enced two gestalt shifts. The first was the shift in perception tied to his 
switching from a nonmoral reading task to the moral task of helping to 
bring about peace and quiet on the car, and the second was the shift tied to 
his switching to a distinctly different moral task of responding compas-
sionately to a grieving family. 
Past Experience, Analogies, Metaphors, and Connectionist Prototypes 
Although switching tasks plays a significant role in day-to-day shifts in 
moral perception, it can also be argued that switching analogies, meta-
phors, and even concepts while engaged in an overtly moral task (such as 
moral deliberation or moral reflection) also results in gestalt shifts in moral 
perception. Chalmers, French, and Hofstadter (1992) describe "high-level 
perceptual processing" (involving the drawing of meaning out of situa-
tions) as consisting of a complex interaction between the process of mak-
ing analogies ("mapping one's situation to another") and the process of 
perceiving the situation ("filtering and organizing [datal in various ways to 
provide an appropriate representation for a given context") (192-195). 
Although they do not directly address either moral perception or gestalt 
shifts in perception, they note that there can be "rival analogies." For 
example, we can shift between viewing Saddam Hussein as being like 
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Hitler and viewing him as being like Robin Hood, a "generous figure 
redistributing the wealth of the Kuwaitis to the rest of the Arab popula-
tion" (199). It is doubtful that Americans would make such a shift sponta-
neously. We would have very little incentive to shift analogies in order to 
view Hussein as Robin Hood unless we made it our moral task, for exam-
ple, to understand how his own people view him. 
Connectionist models of the mind and perception also imply that we 
can experience gestalt-like shifts when our task becomes that of better 
understanding a situation. Churchland's analysis of "conceptual change 
versus conceptual redeployment" is of direct relevance to a discussion 
of gestalt shifts. He describes "conceptual redeployment" as "a process 
in which a conceptual framework that is already fully developed, and in 
regular use in some other domain of experience or comprehension, comes 
to be used for the first time in a new domain" (Churchland 1989, 237). 
Churchland gives the example of Huygens's applying his already well-
developed "wave" conceptual framework to his understanding of light for 
the first time. 
What is not clear in Churchland's account is how often and under what 
circumstances we "conceptually redeploy" in our deliberations and every-
day lives. Many day-to-day gestalt shifts in perception are precipitated by 
the conscious switching of tasks, but there is also no doubt that sudden 
and unexplainable framework shifts periodically occur in our lives. If we 
conceive of conceptual redeployments merely as spontaneous framework 
shifts, redeployments seem few and far between. On the other hand, 
conscious switching to a rival analogy or a different metaphor should also 
count as conceptual redeployments. If so, we "conceptually redeploy" 
quite regularly. Both framework and component shifts in moral perception 
can be viewed in connectionist terms as switching between the activation 
of one moral prototype to the activation of a different (and in some way 
incompatible) prototype in order to make sense of particular situations. 
Churchland does briefly examine the relationship of his connectionist 
model of the mind to moral theory. His description of what occurs in 
moral argument closely parallels my emphasis on gestalt shifts in moral 
perception. For Churchland, moral argument takes place when situations 
are ambiguous and "consists in trying to reduce the exaggerated salience 
of certain features of the situation, and to enhance the salience of certain 
others, in order to change which prototype gets activated" (Church land 
1989,300). 
Another interesting consequence of viewing knowledge as prototypical 
(in a connectionist sense of the word) is that we come to see knowledge as 
much more context dependent. In other words, the representations that 
lade our perceptions are context-dependent representations. Andy Clark 
expands on this notion when he writes, 
140 Peggy DesAutels 
Fodor-style classicists were seen to picture the mind as manipulatillg 
context-free symbolic structures in a straight-forwardly composi_ 
tional manner. 
Connectionists, not having context-free analogues to conceptUal_ 
level items available to them, have to make do with a much mOre 
slippery and hard-to-control kind of "compositionality" which cOn_ 
sists in the mixing together of context-dependent representations. 
(Clark 1993, 25) 
To illustrate what is meant by a context-dependent representation, Clark 
refers to Smolensky's "infamous coffee case." We experience coffee in a 
variety of contexts (liquid coffee in a cup, ground coffee in a can, and So 
on), and Clark argues that as a result, we do not have a single representa_ 
tion for coffee; rather, we have many different "coffee" representations. 
In connectionist terminology, a "coffee" representation comprises a Set 
of activation patterns in the hidden units; 'these patterns vary becaUse 
the contexts varied in which the net was "trained up" on coffee (Clark' 
1993, 24). -~/ (" 
In the light of my definition of a gestalt shift, switching from one 
context-dependent representation of "coffee" to another context-depen_ 
dent representation of "coffee" is tantamount to a gestalt shift. After all, it 
is a shift between two incompatible and "unmerge able" mental structures. 
We cannot unify our various coffee activation patterns into one all-
purpose pattern but must switch between differing context-dependent 
mental structures depending on the context in which we are deploying the 
coffee concept. Nonetheless, it is important to reemphasize that there are 
degrees to which we shift between representations as \ve attempt to draw 
meaning out of a situation.lThese range from framework shifts (where a 
new and complex "wave" prototype is brought to bear on Huygens' 
perception of "light") to component shifts (where in a deliberation over a 
situation involVing coffee, the perceiver can bring one of several coffee 
activation patterns to bear on the situation). It is interesting to note that 
even "coffee" can be tied to a moral perception. We could, for example, be 
engaged in the moral task of determining whether our being addicted to 
coffee is harmful to others. As we deliberate over this "addiction situa-
tion," we may shift between the activation of various context-dependent 
"coffee" representations. 
The pervasiveness of gestalt shifts in connectionist models of the mind 
can also be illuminated by conSidering recent work of Mark Rollins on the 
plasticity of perception.' He emphasizes plasticity in use or the strategy 
ladenness of perceptual knowledge and points out that much of our per-
ceptual experience incorporates strategies having to do with which of our 
already-existing concepts to deploy in a given situation. 'He writes that 
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"plasticity-in-use is important because it can produce a change in the 
effectiveness of content even if not in content itself" (Rollins 1994, 42). 
Once again, the point can be made that whenever we restrategize content 
use, whenever we redeploy concepts, we have shifted in a gestalt-like 
manner in our perceiving of a situation. 
Flanagan Revisited 
With the knowledge that switching between tasks, analogies, metaphors, 
and even contextualized concepts will result in gestalt shifts in our percep-
tions, it is worth reexamining Flanagan's objections to the gestalt shift 
metaphor.' His first concern is that "not all moral issues are open to alterna-
tive construals" (Flanagan 1991, 214). But I have stressed that the experi-
encing of gestalt shifts in moral perception is not determined primarily by 
the nature of the situation.'Rather, in our more unreflective day-to-day 
moral perceptions, shifts are often tied to task switches. In our more 
deliberative moral "perceptions," we can attempt a different perspective on 
any moral issue by attempting to see the situation "through someone 
else's eyes" or by applying a different analogy or metaphor' 
Flanagan's second objection to the gestalt-shift metaphor is that "moral 
consideration, unlike visual perception, takes place over time and can in-
volve weighing as much, and as messy, information as we like" (215). 
However, as I have pointed out, even moral deliberation or consideration 
over time of a particular situation may incorporate mental structures that 
conflict and cannot be merged into single "messy" mental entities. We 
cannot weigh and then merge as much, and as messy, information as we 
like when the information comes in context-dependent pieces.' 
Flanagan stresses that perceptions involving cognition and deliberation 
result in "all-things-considered judgments" (communication with Flanagan 
1994). I agree that a deliberative moral perceiver has an ability to weigh 
alternatives and then arrive at an "all-things-considered" perspective on a 
situation. My point here is that even this consideration process will often 
involve shifting between gestalt-like, context-dependent mental structures. 
In other words, deliberative moral perceptions often involve selecting 
from various incompatible organizing structures rather than constructing a 
single "best" perspective using fine-grained, context-free mental elements. 
Flanagan appears to assume that moral deliberation consists in the manipu-
lation of and recomposition of context-free representations, but connec-
tionist models of mind give us no such fine-grained, context-free mental 
elements with which to "build" moral perceptions. 
Flanagan's final concern is that the gestalt shift metaphor "calls attention 
to the gross features of moral perception [but that] much of what is most 
interesting and individually distinctive about moral personality lies in the 
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small details of what is noticed, deliberated about, and acted on" (Flanagan 
1991, 217). While what I term framework shifts stress the larger-grained 
overall organization of moral perception, there remain finely detailed and 
richly articulated saliencies within each framework. Shifts in and of them-
selves make no difference to the content of what we shift from or to. 
For example, when we shift to a rival analogy, we still have all the rich-
ness and detail of that analogy cognitively available. I have also argued 
throughout this chapter that not all shifts are framework shifts; many 
gestalt shifts are, rather, component shifts in how we view particular 
details. In many moral situations involving several actors, for example, we 
may not reframe the entire situation but shift significantly in our view of 
one of the "players." 
Conclusion 
This discussion has linked moral perception with gestalt shifts by showing 
how we bring already-existing mental structures to bear on situations. 
Altering our perceptions by shifting between already-existing mental 
structures does not by any means comprise all of perceptual cognition-
moral or otherwise. After all, much of learning involves the altering 
of previously existing mental structures and the creating of new mental 
structures. And much of moral thought involves reasoning-using the 
perceived saliencies of a situation as "input" to higher-level, traditionally 
rational mental processes. But it should also be clear that much of per-
ceptual cognition itself-the drawing of meaning from situations-incor-
porates the application of various of our already-in-place concepts and 
conceptual organizations. 
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Notes 
1. For more on the related philosophy of science discussion of gestalt shifts, see Wright 
(1992). 
2. Marilyn Frye (1983) proposes this type of figure-ground refocusing, for example, in 
situations where men have been viewed as the main actors and women as "stagehands" 
in the background; we can refocus these scenes so that the men recede and the women 
come into focus . 
3. Switching from determining what is most fair to determining what is most caring may 
or may not result in our reorganizing our experience. If, for example, what is most fair 
also turns out to be what is most caring, it may be that no reorganization occurs. For 
more on how the concepts of justice and care can overlap, see Friedman (1987). 
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4. Sara Ruddick (1989) has similarly argued that the day-to-day work of mothers deter-
mines the kind of moral thinking they do. 
5. My use of computer-task terminology here is not meant to convey a flippant attitude 
toward moral cognition. I take morality and the living of a moral life very seriously. 
6. Since discussions of moral perception are often linked to discussions of moral realism, I 
should mention that I am neither a moral realist nor do I think that cognitive scientists 
and/or ethical theorists provide any compelling reasons for being so. 
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